Electoral Calculus have done a review of how a House of Lords election may have turned out by 4 different voting methods link to the full article can be found at the bottom.
The number of seats for each area of the country is shown in the table below. There is deliberate over-representation for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as for rural areas such as the north of England.
| Area | Electorate (2010) | Number of Counties | Average County Electorate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anglia | 5,319,066 | 8 | 664,883 |
| East Midlands | 2,708,291 | 4 | 677,073 |
| London | 5,276,908 | 5 | 1,055,382 |
| North | 2,344,071 | 5 | 468,814 |
| North West | 4,085,733 | 5 | 817,147 |
| Northern Ireland | 1,169,184 | 6 | 194,864 |
| Scotland | 3,864,416 | 13 | 297,263 |
| South East | 5,273,154 | 6 | 878,859 |
| South West | 4,494,094 | 8 | 561,762 |
| Wales | 2,261,816 | 8 | 282,727 |
| West Midlands | 4,459,176 | 7 | 637,025 |
| Yorks/Humber | 4,345,151 | 5 | 869,030 |
| United Kingdom | 45,601,060 | 80 | 570,013 |
This proposal could be criticised for producing constituencies of very different sizes. Some Counties are larger than others, and some are very small. The two largest are West Yorkshire (1,551,413) and Hampshire (1,412,555). The two smallest are Orkney and Shetland (33,085), and the Western Isles (22,266). So the ratio of the largest electorate to the smallest is 70. We can compare this with the relative sizes of the States of the United States, which are used as constituencies for the US Senate. The largest state, California, has about 66 times the population of the smallest state, Wyoming. Generally the UK Counties are actually more equally-sized than US States, apart from the Scottish islands. Indeed the rural over-representation in the US Senate costs the average American about 36% of the power of their vote, but the equivalent figure for UK Counties is only 24%.
The over-representation of the rural areas has the political effect of giving an advantage to the Liberal Democrats over the Labour party. (See section six below for more details.) This can be justified on grounds of balance, both because Labour enjoys various advantages in Commons' elections (see Analysis of Con/Lab Gap), and because the Commons arithmetic makes it hard for the third-party to hold power in proportion to its electoral support. That is, if a party consistently gets 20% support, it's average share of power will be less than 20%.
5.2 Electoral system
The choice of proposing the first-past-the-post (FPTP) method as the electoral system has been carefully considered. The main reasons for this choice are as follows:
- It is clear and straightforward, and is already understood and accepted by British voters.
- It allows a party to get control of the House of Lords if it enjoys a good level of support in the country.
- It avoids overdue concentration of power in the hands of smaller parties.
The main problem with some proportional systems, particularly multi-member systems like Party Lists and STV, is that the new chamber can be almost perpetually hung. This could create either permanent gridlock, or hand a considerable amount of power to smaller parties. Evidence of the extent of this problem can be seen in the next section below. Other single-member systems, such as the Alternative Vote (AV), perform similarly to FPTP and can also be considered as a viable method for the House of Lords.
The main argument in favour of proportional systems is that it gives a degree of power to smaller parties. These proposals achieve this by the alternative route of having mixed-size seats (which benefits the smaller nations of the UK), and by the staggered timing of the elections. This increases the chance of a hung chamber, which gives power to smaller parties, but still maintains the ability of major parties to have a majority.
6. Historical analysis of reform proposals in practice
Although theoretical and principled considerations play a strong role in design of the new House of Lords, there is an important place for practical considerations. Any election system which is proposed needs to be tested against actual electoral data to see what the composition of the new chamber would be. A system will only be accepted by the voting public if it is seen to both relatively fair and also to reflect the will of the public. A good system needs to avoid both the problem of perpetual gridlock (a feature of multi-member seats) and the danger of all the power simply going to the largest party in the Commons (the current system).
To measure the effectiveness of various systems, we have conducted an historical analysis using election data over the last thirty years. Under any proposed election system, and at each election date, we estimate the numbers of members elected to the reformed House of Lords. The historical series of such "postdicted" (as opposed to "predicted") results can be compared against the historical composition of the House of Commons. A system will be successful if it is similar but different to the Commons' composition; if it allows a major party to have a majority; if it allows for a hung chamber; and if it remains possible, but more difficult, for a Commons-led government to pass legislation.
We consider four possible systems: the 2012 Bill's proposals, County-based multi-member STV, County-based FPTP, and County-based AV. The full details of these proposals are shown in the table below:
| System Name | Seat definitions | Members per seat | Total Size | Election frequency | Election method |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 Bill | Twelve large regions as defined in the Bill | 9-48 | 360 elected +110 unelected | One third of members every five years | Party List |
| County STV | 80 Historic counties | 4 | 320 | All members at each general election | STV |
| County FPTP | 80 Historic counties | 4 | 320 | One quarter of members every year | FPTP |
| County AV | 80 Historic counties | 4 | 320 | One quarter of members every year | AV |
6.1 The 2012 Bill's proposals
For each general election since 1983, we calculate the number of seats won by each party in a House of Lords elected according to the method proposed by the 2012 House of Lords Reform Bill. The following assumptions were made: ignore the unelected members; and assume the same public support for Lords as the Commons.
The table below shows the general election results since 1983, alongside the predicted Lords results in terms of numbers of seats won for each party. A party needs 181 seats in the Lords to have a majority.
| Election Date | CON % | LAB % | LIB % | UKIP % | Commons Result | CON | LAB | LIB | UKIP | NAT | OTH | Lords Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 Jun 1983 | 43.5 | 28.3 | 26.0 | - | Con majority | 54 | 33 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 3 | Lib coalition choice |
| 11 Jun 1987 | 43.3 | 31.5 | 23.1 | - | Con majority | 52 | 37 | 27 | 0 | 1 | 3 | Lib coalition choice |
| 9 Apr 1992 | 42.8 | 35.2 | 18.3 | - | Con majority | 53 | 43 | 19 | 0 | 2 | 3 | Lib coalition choice |
| 1 May 1997 | 31.4 | 44.4 | 17.2 | - | Lab majority | 39 | 57 | 19 | 0 | 2 | 3 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 7 Jun 2001 | 32.7 | 42.0 | 18.8 | - | Lab majority | 39 | 53 | 22 | 0 | 3 | 3 | Lib coalition choice |
| 5 May 2005 | 33.2 | 36.2 | 22.6 | - | Lab majority | 41 | 47 | 25 | 0 | 3 | 4 | Lib coalition choice |
| 5 May 2010 | 37.0 | 29.7 | 23.6 | 3.2 | Con/Lib coalition | 47 | 41 | 27 | 0 | 2 | 3 | Lib coalition choice |
| 7 May 2015 | 37.8 | 31.2 | 8.1 | 12.9 | Con majority | 48 | 41 | 6 | 15 | 6 | 3 | Con/UKIP coalition |
It is notable that the Lords is always hung under these proposals. Indeed, it is so finely balanced that the Liberal Democrats can almost always choose who runs the Lords. This is not notably democratic, and is a large drawback with this proposal.
6.2 County seats with multi-member STV
We can now look at an improved version of the proposed Bill. We have changed the seats away from the large regions and use instead the eighty historic counties of the UK. The election method is still a multi-member proportional system, but is now the more democratic single-transferable vote (STV), rather than the undemocratic party list system. All the members are elected at each general election. The results are shown in the table below. A party needs 161 seats in the Lords to have a majority.
| Election Date | CON % | LAB % | LIB % | UKIP % | Commons Result | CON | LAB | LIB | UKIP | NAT | OTH | Lords Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 Jun 1983 | 43.5 | 28.3 | 26.0 | - | Con majority | 128 | 72 | 85 | 0 | 11 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 11 Jun 1987 | 43.3 | 31.5 | 23.1 | - | Con majority | 125 | 83 | 80 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Lib coalition choice |
| 9 Apr 1992 | 42.8 | 35.2 | 18.3 | - | Con majority | 119 | 99 | 63 | 0 | 15 | 24 | Lib coalition choice |
| 1 May 1997 | 31.4 | 44.4 | 17.2 | - | Lab majority | 85 | 133 | 63 | 0 | 15 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 7 Jun 2001 | 32.7 | 42.0 | 18.8 | - | Lab majority | 90 | 125 | 64 | 0 | 17 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 5 May 2005 | 33.2 | 36.2 | 22.6 | - | Lab majority | 91 | 110 | 82 | 0 | 12 | 25 | Lib coalition choice |
| 5 May 2010 | 37.0 | 29.7 | 23.6 | 3.2 | Con/Lib coalition | 109 | 94 | 83 | 0 | 10 | 24 | Lib coalition choice |
| 7 May 2015 | 37.8 | 31.2 | 8.1 | 12.9 | Con majority | 116 | 104 | 18 | 30 | 28 | 24 | Hung |
Again, there was no time in last thirty years when any party would have a majority in the Lords. It is hard to think that such perpetual gridlock would conform to the wishes of the British voters, and so this proposal should also be rejected.
6.3 County seats with first-past-the-post
Now we change the voting system back to the familiar system used most widely in the UK. The seats are kept as the eighty historic counties, each electing one member (for a four-year term) every year. There are 320 members of the new Lords, and a party needs 161 seats to have a majority. Because there is a Lords election every year, the composition of the new Lords is shown for every year. We have assumed that popular voting shares evolve linearly between general elections.
| Election Year | CON % | LAB % | LIB % | UKIP % | Commons Result | CON | LAB | LIB | UKIP | NAT | OTH | Lords Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1983 | 43.5 | 28.5 | 25.7 | - | Con majority | 200 | 76 | 12 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 80 |
| 1984 | 43.5 | 29.0 | 25.4 | - | Con majority | 204 | 70 | 14 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 88 |
| 1985 | 43.4 | 29.8 | 24.6 | - | Con majority | 204 | 68 | 16 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 88 |
| 1986 | 43.3 | 30.6 | 23.9 | - | Con majority | 204 | 68 | 16 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 88 |
| 1987 | 43.3 | 31.5 | 23.2 | - | Con majority | 199 | 71 | 18 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 78 |
| 1988 | 43.2 | 32.2 | 22.2 | - | Con majority | 192 | 77 | 19 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 64 |
| 1989 | 43.1 | 33.0 | 21.2 | - | Con majority | 187 | 81 | 20 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 54 |
| 1990 | 43.0 | 33.7 | 20.2 | - | Con majority | 182 | 85 | 21 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 44 |
| 1991 | 42.9 | 34.5 | 19.3 | - | Con majority | 178 | 91 | 19 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 36 |
| 1992 | 42.7 | 35.3 | 18.3 | - | Con majority | 173 | 96 | 19 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 26 |
| 1993 | 40.4 | 37.1 | 18.1 | - | Con majority | 164 | 104 | 20 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 8 |
| 1994 | 38.2 | 38.9 | 17.9 | - | Con majority | 151 | 116 | 21 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 1995 | 36.0 | 40.8 | 17.6 | - | Con majority | 137 | 127 | 24 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 1996 | 33.7 | 42.6 | 17.4 | - | Con majority | 120 | 142 | 26 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 1997 | 31.4 | 44.4 | 17.2 | - | Lab majority | 102 | 160 | 26 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 1998 | 31.8 | 43.8 | 17.6 | - | Lab majority | 89 | 173 | 26 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Lab majority 26 |
| 1999 | 32.1 | 43.3 | 18.0 | - | Lab majority | 79 | 183 | 26 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Lab majority 46 |
| 2000 | 32.4 | 42.7 | 18.4 | - | Lab majority | 77 | 185 | 26 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Lab majority 50 |
| 2001 | 32.7 | 42.1 | 18.8 | - | Lab majority | 82 | 181 | 26 | 0 | 7 | 24 | Lab majority 42 |
| 2002 | 32.8 | 40.7 | 19.7 | - | Lab majority | 86 | 176 | 27 | 0 | 7 | 24 | Lab majority 32 |
| 2003 | 33.0 | 39.2 | 20.7 | - | Lab majority | 90 | 171 | 28 | 0 | 7 | 24 | Lab majority 22 |
| 2004 | 33.1 | 37.7 | 21.7 | - | Lab majority | 95 | 164 | 30 | 0 | 7 | 24 | Lab majority 8 |
| 2005 | 33.2 | 36.2 | 22.6 | - | Lab majority | 101 | 155 | 31 | 0 | 9 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2006 | 34.0 | 34.9 | 22.8 | 0.6 | Lab majority | 108 | 147 | 31 | 0 | 10 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2007 | 34.7 | 33.6 | 23.0 | 1.3 | Lab majority | 117 | 138 | 30 | 0 | 11 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2008 | 35.5 | 32.3 | 23.2 | 1.9 | Lab majority | 125 | 131 | 28 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Hung |
| 2009 | 36.2 | 31.0 | 23.4 | 2.5 | Lab majority | 131 | 123 | 29 | 0 | 13 | 24 | Hung |
| 2010 | 37.0 | 29.7 | 23.6 | 3.2 | Con/Lib coalition | 136 | 116 | 31 | 0 | 13 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 2011 | 37.1 | 30.0 | 20.5 | 5.1 | Con/Lib coalition | 141 | 112 | 29 | 0 | 14 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 2012 | 37.3 | 30.3 | 17.4 | 7.0 | Con/Lib coalition | 146 | 110 | 25 | 0 | 15 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 2013 | 37.5 | 30.6 | 14.3 | 9.0 | Con/Lib coalition | 151 | 111 | 19 | 0 | 15 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 2014 | 37.6 | 30.9 | 11.2 | 10.9 | Con/Lib coalition | 156 | 113 | 12 | 0 | 15 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 2015 | 37.8 | 31.2 | 8.1 | 12.9 | Con majority | 158 | 106 | 8 | 0 | 24 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
These results show a clear improvement on the multi-member systems. Major parties can often have a majority in the new House of Lords, but it is not guaranteed. The staggered elections mean that a governing party loses momentum earlier in the Lords. For example, John Major would have lost his majority in the Lords in 1994 (following Black Wednesday in October 1992), and Tony Blair's 2005 victory in the Commons would not have been enough to give a majority in the Lords. In both these cases, political compromises would have to have been made due to the changing mandate from the voters.
6.4 County seats with the Alternative Vote system
This proposal is very similar to the FPTP method of 6.3 above, and retains the features of historical county seats plus annual elections of one quarter of the 320 members. The only change is that each member is elected using the Alternative Vote system rather than first-past-the-post. This gives some advantage to the Liberal Democrats.
| Election Year | CON % | LAB % | LIB % | UKIP % | Commons Result | CON | LAB | LIB | UKIP | NAT | OTH | Lords Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1983 | 43.5 | 28.5 | 25.7 | - | Con majority | 194 | 74 | 16 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Con majority 68 |
| 1984 | 43.5 | 29.0 | 25.4 | - | Con majority | 197 | 69 | 18 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Con majority 74 |
| 1985 | 43.4 | 29.8 | 24.6 | - | Con majority | 198 | 66 | 20 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Con majority 76 |
| 1986 | 43.3 | 30.6 | 23.9 | - | Con majority | 197 | 66 | 21 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Con majority 74 |
| 1987 | 43.3 | 31.5 | 23.2 | - | Con majority | 193 | 70 | 22 | 0 | 11 | 24 | Con majority 66 |
| 1988 | 43.2 | 32.2 | 22.2 | - | Con majority | 189 | 73 | 24 | 0 | 10 | 24 | Con majority 58 |
| 1989 | 43.1 | 33.0 | 21.2 | - | Con majority | 184 | 77 | 26 | 0 | 9 | 24 | Con majority 48 |
| 1990 | 43.0 | 33.7 | 20.2 | - | Con majority | 180 | 80 | 28 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 40 |
| 1991 | 42.9 | 34.5 | 19.3 | - | Con majority | 177 | 83 | 28 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 34 |
| 1992 | 42.7 | 35.3 | 18.3 | - | Con majority | 169 | 91 | 28 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Con majority 18 |
| 1993 | 40.4 | 37.1 | 18.1 | - | Con majority | 159 | 100 | 28 | 0 | 9 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 1994 | 38.2 | 38.9 | 17.9 | - | Con majority | 146 | 112 | 28 | 0 | 10 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 1995 | 36.0 | 40.8 | 17.6 | - | Con majority | 131 | 125 | 29 | 0 | 11 | 24 | Hung |
| 1996 | 33.7 | 42.6 | 17.4 | - | Con majority | 117 | 137 | 30 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 1997 | 31.4 | 44.4 | 17.2 | - | Lab majority | 99 | 153 | 32 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 1998 | 31.8 | 43.8 | 17.6 | - | Lab majority | 84 | 166 | 34 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Lab majority 12 |
| 1999 | 32.1 | 43.3 | 18.0 | - | Lab majority | 72 | 177 | 35 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Lab majority 34 |
| 2000 | 32.4 | 42.7 | 18.4 | - | Lab majority | 67 | 181 | 36 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Lab majority 42 |
| 2001 | 32.7 | 42.1 | 18.8 | - | Lab majority | 72 | 176 | 37 | 0 | 11 | 24 | Lab majority 32 |
| 2002 | 32.8 | 40.7 | 19.7 | - | Lab majority | 76 | 170 | 40 | 0 | 10 | 24 | Lab majority 20 |
| 2003 | 33.0 | 39.2 | 20.7 | - | Lab majority | 84 | 160 | 43 | 0 | 9 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2004 | 33.1 | 37.7 | 21.7 | - | Lab majority | 90 | 151 | 47 | 0 | 8 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2005 | 33.2 | 36.2 | 22.6 | - | Lab majority | 95 | 142 | 50 | 0 | 9 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2006 | 34.0 | 34.9 | 22.8 | 0.6 | Lab majority | 101 | 133 | 52 | 0 | 10 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2007 | 34.7 | 33.6 | 23.0 | 1.3 | Lab majority | 106 | 125 | 54 | 0 | 11 | 24 | Lab/Lib coalition |
| 2008 | 35.5 | 32.3 | 23.2 | 1.9 | Lab majority | 112 | 116 | 55 | 0 | 13 | 24 | Lib coalition choice |
| 2009 | 36.2 | 31.0 | 23.4 | 2.5 | Lab majority | 118 | 108 | 56 | 0 | 14 | 24 | Lib coalition choice |
| 2010 | 37.0 | 29.7 | 23.6 | 3.2 | Con/Lib coalition | 120 | 109 | 53 | 0 | 14 | 24 | Lib coalition choice |
| 2011 | 37.1 | 30.0 | 20.5 | 5.1 | Con/Lib coalition | 120 | 114 | 48 | 0 | 14 | 24 | Lib coalition choice |
| 2012 | 37.3 | 30.3 | 17.4 | 7.0 | Con/Lib coalition | 125 | 120 | 38 | 0 | 13 | 24 | Con/Lib coalition |
| 2013 | 37.5 | 30.6 | 14.3 | 9.0 | Con/Lib coalition | 129 | 128 | 27 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Hung |
| 2014 | 37.6 | 30.9 | 11.2 | 10.9 | Con/Lib coalition | 140 | 126 | 18 | 0 | 12 | 24 | Hung |
| 2015 | 37.8 | 31.2 | 8.1 | 12.9 | Con majority | 150 | 115 | 10 | 0 | 21 | 24 | Hung |
The results are also quite similar to FPTP. There are clear periods where a major party has a Lords majority. But there are also increased periods when the Lords is balanced/hung. In fact, it would have had no overall majority for all of the last ten years. This makes the AV system look viable, but probably not preferred as the best democratic outcome. Though it will probably be the favoured choice of the Liberal Democrats.
